

should (morally) be treated as ends in themselves, but he (nor anyone else, to my knowledge) has not demonstrated that only moral agents should (morally) be treated as ends in themselves. Furthermore, since what, from the Kantian perspective, is supposed to be unique about moral agents is our ability to act disinterestedly, impartially, fairly, etc., it hardly seems credible that possessing this capacity can morally justify our pursuing our self-interest and exploiting animals. Citing our ability to act out of a sense of justice as the justification for saying that we need not worry about justice when it comes to our dealings with animals would seem to be a paradigm of a practical contradiction. Hence, even if animals are incapable of being moral agents, it is at least doubtful that this entitles us to exploit them.

Thus, animals' innocence, i.e., their inability to be fully moral agents, can contribute to answering the "But animals eat other animals!" objection to animal rights and can do so without leaving animal rights vulnerable to the Kantian side of the Dilemma of Innocence. That seems to me how it enters seriously into the animal rights debate.

Notes

1. We may also note that the suggestion in P2 that it is morally acceptable to treat criminals as mere means to society's satisfactions would likely not be accepted by morally concerned people today.

2. "Are Animals Moral Beings?," American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1981).

3. I discuss these "But animals eat other animals!" complexities to animal rights at greater length in Chapter 6 of my forthcoming Morals, Reason, and Animals.



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MOONSPAN

Wolves

Children of the moon
Sired by the night wind
(She tolerates him kindly
as goddesses will
who long for children)

Wolves'

Voices rising
Echo their sire
In rivalry of him
They race across
The rippling snows
In speed and silence
With Her silver
Still staining their fur
Lunar gold
Glow through their eyes

Luna weeps for her children
The night wind wails in grief

Humankind: take heed
For She

Controls the tides
And he commands the seas

And their children are dying

Paulette Callen

(continued from p. 11)

3. Ibid., and see my "Accountability and Answerability," Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 2/2 (1972).

4. Jamieson and Regan, op. cit.

5. Ibid.

6. Cf. William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 101.

7. "Why (Most) Humans Are More Impor-

BETWEEN THE SPECIES